

TENTATIVE SYLLABUS

Date	Topic	Readings (it is advised to do them in the given order)
Part I: BASIC CONCEPTS		
Sep 9	Standard deontic logic	McNamara 2006/2014: (1) pp. 1-20; (2) pp. 21-8; (3) pp. 29-35 & 80-86.
Sep 16	Personal and impersonal obligation propositions	(1) McNamara 2006/2014: 42-53; (2) Forrester 1996: ch. 4; (3) Ross 2010: 307-18.
Sep 23	Varieties of permission	Hansson 2013: (1) pp. 195-218; (2) pp. 218-237.
Sep 30	Free choice permission	(1) Makinson 1984; (2) Asher & Bonevac 2005: 303-17; (3) Fine 2014.
Oct 7	Reasons	(1) Bedke 2011; (2) Nair 2016: 629-55.
Oct 14	Supererogation	McNamara 2011: (1) pp. 202-18; (2) 219-33.
Part II: PARADOXES AND SOLUTIONS		
Oct 21	Forrester's gentle murder paradox	(1) Forrester 1984 & Sinnott-Armstrong 1985; (2) Castañeda 1986; (3) Goble 1991.
Oct 28	Chisholm's contrary-to-duty paradox	(1) McNamara 2006/2014: 35-9 & 86-94; (2) Greenspan 1975; (3) Castañeda 1977: 775-88.
Nov 4	Monadic deontic systems	(1) Thomason 1981; (2) Goble 1990.
Nov 11	Dyadic systems without factual detachment	(1) Lewis 1974; (2) Goldman 1977; (3) Tomberlin 1989.
Nov 18	Dyadic systems with restricted factual detachment	(1) Belzer & Loewer 1994; (2) Vorobej 1986.
Dec 2	Recalcitrant versions of Chisholm's paradox	Carmo & Jones 2002: (1) pp. 272-89; (2) pp. 298-323.
Dec 9	Contextualism	(1) Cariani 2013; (2) Silk 2014.

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