

TENTATIVE SYLLABUS

All readings are on Canvas. You only need to read the pages listed in the table below (although for many readings more pages are on Canvas).

Date	Topic	Readings (it is advised to do them in the given order)
Part I: INTRODUCTION TO MORAL DILEMMAS		
Sep 10	Overview of the issues	(1) McConnell 2002/2018: 1-14; (2) Finkelstein 2001: 279-306.
Sep 17	Defining moral dilemmas	(1) Sinnott-Armstrong 1988: 1- 34; (2) Brink 1994: 215-25.
Sep 24	Kinds of moral dilemmas	(1) Sinnott-Armstrong 1996: 48-62; (2) Railton 1996: 146-59; (3) Vallentyne 1989: 301-16.
Part II: ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL DILEMMAS		
Oct 1	Arguments from moral residue	(1) Sinnott-Armstrong 1988: 36-53; (2) Williams 1965: 103-17; (3) McConnell 1996: 36-45.
Oct 8	Arguments from incomparability	(1) Sinnott-Armstrong 1988: 54-70; (2) Statman 1995: 55-82.
Oct 15	Arguments from symmetry	(1) Dovi 2006: 174-88; (2) Bagnoli 2006: 157-68; (3) Robinson 2013: 203-23.
Oct 22	Conceptual arguments	(1) Tessman 2015: 11-24; (2) Tessman 2015: 24-55.
Part III: ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL DILEMMAS		
Oct 29	Arguments from deontic logic	(1) Sinnott-Armstrong 1988: 108-35; (2) Brink 1994: 226-42.
Nov 5	Response I: Reject ought-implies-can	(1) Vranas 2007: 169-86; (2) Vranas 2018a: 1-15; (3) Vranas 2018b: 499-505.
Nov 12	Response II: Reject some deontic principles	(1) Goble 2009: 450-76; (2) Goble 2013: 206-13.
Nov 19	Response III: Adopt the conflict account	(1) Horty 2003: 557-77; (2) Horty 2003: 577-96.
Nov 26	Arguments from action-guidingness	(1) Sinnott-Armstrong 1988: 169-88; (2) McConnell 1978: 280-7; (3) McDonald 1987: 92-109.
Part IV: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE ON THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL DILEMMAS		
Dec 3	Implications for ethical theory	(1) McConnell 1981: 245-56; (2) Norcross 1995: 59-81; (3) Pietroski 1994: 201-7.
Dec 10	Implications for metaethics & legal theory	(1) Foot 1983: 379-97; (2) Brink 1994: 242-6; (3) Priest 1987: 227-35.

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